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11.1  Introduction 
Gone are the days when the telecommunications sectors in most coun- 
tries were governed as state monopolies. This trend toward telecommuni- 
cations liberalization has become increasingly apparent since the  1980s 
and now is taking place in Taiwan. While global deregulation and Taiwan’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) carried weight in polit- 
ical minds, there are a few internal self-driving forces at work strengthen- 
ing the will to liberalize the industry. Critical developmental policies relat- 
ing  to  the  Asia-Pacific Regional  Operations  Center  and  the National 
Information Infrastructure are characterized by  the promotion of institu- 
tional  reform  and soft  infrastructure  as  new  competitive  parameters. 
Added to this, changes in industrial parameters, such as scale economies 
and scope economies, call for the transformation from a state monopoly 
in a competitive telecommunications market. At the heart of Taiwan’s de- 
regulatory process are the organizational separation of the public telecom- 
munications operator from the regulator and the introduction of private 
competition. Also the reform framework is characterized by  a two-tiered 
regulatory regime for different segments of telecommunications services. 
Substantial progress has been made, but much remains to be done. 
Against this background, this paper examines the policy framework and 
the implementation of Taiwan’s telecommunications liberalization. Its aim 
is to distill lessons that may add to the current understanding of telecom- 
munications liberalization that has been derived mainly from the devel- 
oped world, rather than to comprehensively evaluate the whole program. 
Shin-Horng Chen is deputy director of the second division of the Chung-Hua Institution 
for Economic Research, Taiwan. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1  1.2 reviews 
the historical background of Taiwan’s telecommunications industry prior 
to liberalization. It is followed in section 11.3 by a discussion of current 
progress in telecommunications liberalization in Taiwan. In particular, the 
policy framework is outlined. Section 1  1.4 puts forward a few criticisms of 
the liberalization program. Section 11.5 highlights problems arising from 
market entry. The wrangling over industrial policy versus competition pol- 
icy in the deregulatory process in Taiwan is taken up in section l l .6. Sec- 
tion  11.7 discusses the emerging issues that warrant the attention of the 
regulatory authority. Finally, section 1  1.8 draws conclusions. 
11.2  Historical Background 
Until recently, virtually all telecommunications services in Taiwan were 
provided by its public telecommunications operator, the Directorate Gen- 
eral of Telecommunications (DGT), under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications (MOTC). Based on the Telecommu- 
nications Act of 1958, the DGT assumed both regulatory and operational 
responsibilities. A wide span of business activities, ranging across voice 
telephonic services, data communications, satellite communications, and 
training and research, were all operated by the DGT. While the Telecom- 
munications Act of  1977 technically allowed domestic private and public 
organizations to enter the local telephone service market, this did not re- 
ally happen, due to the dominance of the DGT. At the same time, a few 
state enterprises were granted permission by  the MOTC to install dedi- 
cated telecommunications networks limited strictly to internal communi- 
cations and monitoring. Also, six international news agencies-Reuters, 
for example-were  allowed to lease direct link circuits from the DGT to 
communicate with their global news networks. As a result, their subsidiar- 
ies in Taiwan acted more or less like value-added network service provid- 
ers. Nonetheless, these were exceptions. The DGT was mandated to pro- 
vide comprehensive telecommunications services in Taiwan. 
As the administrator and public operator of telecommunications in Tai- 
wan, the DGT was governed as an official body with limited independent 
authority. Its human resource management and procurement were subject 
to tight control and scrutiny. Its employees were qualified as civil servants 
and tended to be vulnerable to the criticism that they demonstrated in- 
sufficient customer orientation. Like many public utilities in Taiwan, the 
DGT was required to meet a return rate of investment, with a profit cap 
of 11.5 percent. There is a danger that monopolistic utilities such as the 
DGT, may, under the veil of investment return rates, unduly favor the use 
of capital relative to other inputs, so that output might be produced at an 
inefficiently high cost, a scenario known as the Averch-Johnson effect. On 
top of this, it cannot be taken for granted that the DGT will share its Telecommunications Liberalization: A Taiwanese Perspective  329 
excess profits with customers by  reducing tariffs, due to the absence of 
competition and to delay in the process of changing tariff schemes. Fur- 
thermore, like other public telecommunications operators throughout the 
world, the DGT  employed cross-subsidization to provide certain of its tele- 
communications services at “affordable” prices, as part of its universal ser- 
vice obligations. In this regard, tariffs were priced below cost for local calls 
but significantly above cost for trunk and international calls and for mo- 
bile communications. Though quite common worldwide, there has been 
concern that this divergence from cost, as a result of cross-subsidization, 
might distort price signals to the users of telecommunications networks. 
Due credit should be given to the DGT for establishing and moderniz- 
ing the telecommunications infrastructure in Taiwan. Table 1  1.1 presents 
a set of performance indicators for the DGT over the period 1991-95.  For 
example, the penetration rate of telephone mainlines in Taiwan was 41.3 
per  100 inhabitants in  1995, as against 0.29 in  1950 and 32.1 in  1991, 
which was close to the OECD average in 1990 (42.58; OECD 1993, 10). 
Headway has also been made by the DGT in expanding mobile communi- 
cations services. As a result, 1995 witnessed a penetration rate of 90.8 per 
1,000 inhabitants for radio pagers and 27.9 for cellular phones. To date, 
the completion rates of digitization of local telephone switching, toll trunk 
exchanges, and toll trunk circuits are all above 90 percent, with toll trunk 
exchanges having been completely digitized in 1994. 
However, it  has become increasingly difficult for the DGT to meet 
mounting  demand  for  communications  services.  Recently,  remarkable 
growth in mobile communications in Taiwan has resulted in a situation 
where demand outstrips supply. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands 
of inhabitants have been on the waiting list to subscribe to cellular phone 
and radio paging services, due to underestimation  of consumer demand 
on the part of the DGT and to delay in the procurement process. Such a 
huge unmet  demand for cellular phone and radio paging services and 
hence the long waiting period for connection to the services reflected the 
deteriorating quality of service provided by the DGT. Ironically, the regu- 
latory authority will not start to monitor and collect data on quality of 
service until 1998. Having said that, it is estimated that the waiting period 
for mobile phone and radio paging services is not less than one year, given 
the long waiting list discussed above. Partly for this reason, mobile com- 
munications is the first target for market liberalization, which will be dis- 
cussed later. 
The DGT, though never involved in the manufacturing of telecommuni- 
cations equipment, had a stake in three local producers of public switching 
systems  (Taiwan  Alcatel  International  Standard  Electronics,  Siemens 
Telecommunications System, and AT&T Taiwan Telecommunications). 
These three firms are international joint ventures led by Alcatel, Siemens, 
and AT&T, respectively. Of note is the fact that they each enjoyed a de Table 11.1  Business Performance of Directorate General of Telecommunications,  1991-95 
Item  1995  1994 
Local telephone exchanges 
Local telephone switching digitization (YO) 
Local telephone subscribers 
Telephone density (per 100 inhabitants) 
Resident subscriber density (per 100 households) 
Public telephones 
Public telephone density (per 1,000 inhabitants) 
Radio pager subscribers 
Radio pager density (per 1,000 inhabitants) 
Cellular phone subscribers 
Cellular phone density (per 1,000 inhabitants) 
Toll truck exchanges 
Toll truck exchange digitization (%) 
Toll truck circuits 
Toll truck circuit digitization (YO) 
Domestic data communications dedicated line rentals 
Dial-up data communications subscribers 
Packet switched data communications subscribers 
Videotex subscribers 
Universal database access system 
International telephone direct link circuits 
International satellite communications circuits 























































































































Source: Directorate General of Telecommunications 1996, http://www.dgt.gov.tw/. Telecommunications Liberalization: A Taiwanese Perspective  331 
facto spatial monopoly over the provision of public switching systems for 
the three broad (northern, central, and southern) regions of Taiwan, which 
is known as the “three systems, three suppliers” policy. This resulted from 
a government policy introducing digitized switching technology via for- 
eign investment in 1985. It was hoped that the DGT’s investment in the 
three companies might facilitate technology transfer from their overseas 
parents.  However, the extent  to  which  core competencies of  digitized 
switching technology were localized within Taiwan is still open to ques- 
tion. In addition, the three companies were often accused of overcharging 
for the systems they provided. 
11.3  Progress in Telecommunications Liberalization 
Since the 1980s, an increasingly significant development on the global 
telecommunications landscape has been the move from monopolization to 
liberalization. This trend was pioneered by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan in the early 1980s and then followed by  many other 
countries. Taiwan has also followed suit. This move, however, is not just 
jumping on the bandwagon but reflects a belief that telecommunications 
liberalization should be an integral part of Taiwan’s midterm development 
policy. In fact, several attempts were  made in  the late  1970s and early 
1980s to provide the statutory basis for the corporatization of the DGT 
and liberalization of the industry. Relevant draft bills tabled at that time, 
however, were not enacted, due in part to the resistance of the telecommu- 
nications trade union (Cheng et al. 1989, 38-39).  These initial efforts did 
bear fruit, in the liberalization of the customer premises equipment (CPE) 
market and the regulatory relaxation of access to telecommunications net- 
works that have taken place since 1987. Further momentum was gained 
as the DGT started to liberalize some segments of value-added network 
(VAN) services from 1989 onward. 
Meanwhile, the issue of the transformation of the industrial structure 
surfaced when three telecommunications reform bills were drafted. This 
was due to external pressures and internal self-driving forces. On the one 
hand, the global trend of deregulation and Taiwan’s accession to the WTO 
carried weight with politicians. On the other hand, critical development 
policies relating to the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC) 
and the National Information Infrastructure (NII) were the internal forces 
at work strengthening resolve. Both programs are at the forefront of public 
policy in Taiwan’s midterm economic development. The APROC plan has 
two major aspects. First, it aims to promote Taiwan as a center of  the 
Asia-Pacific region by developing regional manufacturing, sea transporta- 
tion, air transportation, financial, telecommunications, and media centers. 
Second, it serves to engineer a highly  liberalized and internationalized 
economy. The APROC program proposes to develop Taiwan into a tele- 332  Shin-Horng Chen 
communications center, among others, which will be able to provide rea- 
sonably priced, high-quality telecommunications services regionwide. In 
addition, the NII program aims to construct an information superhigh- 
way, preferably led by  the private sector through unleashed competition. 
It embodies the goals of upgrading  telecommunications infrastructure, 
stimulating innovation, introducing novel applications, and setting up an 
appropriate regulatory framework. To achieve the aims of these two pro- 
grams, it is  necessary for Taiwan to deregulate its telecommunications 
market. With the passage of  the three telecommunications reform bills 
in January  1996, both the resolve and the means to open up Taiwan’s 
telecommunications sector have emerged. Accordingly, a large-scale tele- 
communications liberalization program, albeit involving an evolutionary 
process, is under way in Taiwan. 
In addition, evidence on the industrial parameters of the sector, gleaned 
from other sources, lends support for the introduction of telecommunica- 
tions liberalization. The concepts of scale economies and scope economies 
have been used in rationalizing the monopolization of the telecommunica- 
tions industry. A study supported by the Council for Economic Planning 
and Development (CEPD 1996) revealed that the cost function of the DGT 
indeed featured scale economies, but they have been declining over time due 
to the introduction of new technologies. Moreover, it established no evi- 
dence to support the argument that the DGT enjoyed scope economies. 
Before 1995, telecommunications liberalization in Taiwan was limited 
in scale. Over the period  1987-94,  the liberalization process focused on 
deregulating the  CPE market,  access to telecommunications networks, 
and VAN services (table 11.2). By  the end of  1994, the DGT’s monopoly 
on the supply of numerous items of CPE was rescinded. Subscribers were 
allowed to obtain their own CPE and in-house lines. As a result, the CPE 
market was opened to competition. Private competition was also intro- 
duced in eight kinds of VAN  services. In addition, restrictions on the 
terms for access and lease of telecommunications networks and circuits 
were  loosened.  More  recently,  CT-2  (second-generation cordless  tele- 
phone) service was opened to the private sector at the end of  1995. This 
move went beyond the liberalization of VAN services and served as a pre- 
lude to a more radical transformation of Taiwan’s telecommunications in- 
dustry, since, according to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CT-2 is 
classified as part of so-called Type I services (common carriers). 
Further momentum was gained after the three telecommunications re- 
form acts were promulgated in January 1996 and became law the following 
month. They are the Telecommunications  Act of 1996, the Organizational 
Statute of the DGT, and the Statute of Chunghwa Telecom Co. Ltd. (table 
11.3). The Telecommunications  Act of 1996 sets out the framework within 
which Taiwan’s telecommunications industry is to be reformed. The act 
creates a dichotomy of telecommunications services. Type I services refer Telecommunications Liberalization:  A Taiwanese Perspective  333 
Table 11.2  Telecommunications  Liberalization in Taiwan before 1995 
Date 
Customer premises equipment 
Telephone sets 
Modems (2,400 bps) 
Telex terminals 
Modems (9,600 bps) 
Modems (9,600 bps) 
Cellular telephones 
Radio pagers 
Access to networks 
Domestic leased circuits shared by value-added network (VAN) 
International leased circuits shared allowed 
In-house lines 
Connection of domestic leased circuits with local phone 
Restrictions eased on leasing domestic and international leased 
service operators and their customers allowed 
systems allowed 
lines by  VAN service providers 
Telecommunications services 
Domestic VAN services (information storage and retrieval, 
information processing, remote transaction, word processing, 
voice mail, e-mail) 
International VAN services (as indicated above) 
VAN services (bulletin board system, electronic data 
Home/office-based  second-generation cordless telephone (CT-2) 
Public CT-2 





















Source: Directorate General of Telecommunications, White paper on telecommunications (in 
Chinese; Taipei, 1995), 329-30. 
to the installation of telecommunications machinery and line facilities and 
to services provided through owned circuits and facilities. Those services 
other than Type I are referred to as Type 11.  While private firms will be 
allowed to enter virtually all segments of the telecommunications market, 
the extent of regulatory control differs between Type I and Type I1 carri- 
ers. Type I1 carriers need only approval from the DGT to start business, 
while special approval and a license issued by the MOTC are required for 
private firms to provide Type I services that are subject to phased liberal- 
ization. Under the two-tiered regulatory regime, the planned  scenario is 
that Type I1 services will be characterized by open competition, but Type 
I services will  involve regulated competition among a limited number of 
providers. The latter is deemed appropriate on the grounds that the DGT 
enjoyed scale economies, though they are declining over time (Jang 1993). 
In addition, this act legalizes the principle of equal access to telecommuni- 334  Shin-Horng Chen 
Table 11.3  Outline of Three Telecommunications Reform Acts in Taiwan, 1996 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 
1. Delineation of Type I and Type I1 telecommunications enterprises. 
2. Regulations on the extent of liberalization and foreign participation in the two types of 
3. Prohibition on cross-subsidies between the two types of telecommunications enterprises. 
4.  Establishment and collection of funds for the provision of universal services. 
5. Equal access to telecommunications networks. 
6. Establishment of a pricing system to allocate radio frequencies. 
7. Enhancement of the telecommunications inspection system. 
Organizational Statute of the Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT) 
1. Release of the DGT from operational responsibility. 
2. Clarification of the roles of the DGT in 
telecommunications enterprises. 
drafting and implementing telecommunications policies, 
approving and reviewing telecommunications tariffs, 
drafting and examining telecommunications technical specifications, and 
inspecting and supervising telecommunications carriers and their activities. 
3. Restructuring of the DGT and its subordinate institutions. 
4.  Establishment of regional telecommunications regulatory stations. 
5. Establishment of a telecommunications conciliation committee to settle 
telecommunications disputes. 
Statute of Chunghwa Telecom Co. Ltd. (CHT) 
1. Establishment of CHT as a state-owned telecommunications operator. 
2. Assignment to CHT of considerable operational discretionary authority, especially 
concerning organizational structure and regulations, in order to enhance operating 
efficiency. 
3. Application of ex post auditing to CHTS procurements. 
4.  Preservation of favorable welfare conditions for CHT’s employees transferred from the 
former DGT. 
Source: Adapted from Chen (1997). 
cations networks and prohibition of cross-subsidies between the two types 
of services, where applicable. Also provided is a legal basis to develop a 
pricing system to allocate radio frequencies, given the fact that they have 
become economic goods (Kelly 1992). On top of these, the act stipulates 
the extent of foreign participation in Taiwan’s telecommunications market. 
There is no restriction on foreign ownership for Type I1 carriers, but a 20 
percent limit on investment by foreigners is imposed for individual Type I 
operators (table  11.4). The regulatory framework adopted in Taiwan is 
similar to that in Japan a decade ago (Sato and Stevenson 1989). While a 
more liberalized framework has currently been adopted in Japan and such 
countries as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United States, it is not 
uncommon in OECD countries for local, national, and international calls 
and mobile communications, which fall within Type I services in Taiwan, 
to be handled by firms that have limited competition, and even monopoly 
status (OECD 1997). Given the proposed liberalization schedule for the Telecommunications Liberalization: A Taiwanese Perspective  335 
Table 11.4  Types of Telecommunications Carriers 
Industry Framework  Type I Carriers  Type I1 Carriers 
Business activities 
Government regulation 






machinery and line 
facilities and provision of 
telecommunications 
services through owned 
telecommunications 
circuits and facilities" 
Special approval and issue of 
a license by the MOTC 
required 
Approval of primary tariff 
schedules by the MOTC 
required 
Approval of secondary tariff 
schedules by the DGT 
required 
Proportion of total shares 
held by foreigners limited 
to 20 percent 
Telecommunications 
services apart from 
Type 1 
Approval by the DGT 
required 
Notification to the DGT 
required 
Unregulated 
Source: Adapted from Chen (1997). 
aThe main items of Type I currently include local calls, toll calls, international calls, mobile 
communications, satellite communications, broadband switching communications, and high- 
speed data communications. 
next five years, which will be discussed later, it is likely that the two-tiered 
regulatory framework in Taiwan will remain intact in the near future. Hav- 
ing said that, MOTC, the competent ministry, is inclined to exempt satel- 
lite communications from foreign ownership limits. 
The other two acts, also outlined in table 11.3, form the statutory basis 
for restructuring the DGT and establishing a state-owned corporatized 
telecommunications operator, namely, Chunghwa Telecom (CHT). The 
Organizational Statute of the DGT demands the DGT be released from 
its  operational responsibility to act  merely  as  a  regulatory authority. 
Among other responsibilities, the DGT is required under this law to estab- 
lish a telecommunications conciliation committee to settle telecommuni- 
cations disputes. The Statute of CHT authorizes a spinoff from the DGT 
to be incorporated as a state-owned telecommunications carrier. It also 
outlines the corporation's  main business activities and basic organiza- 
tional structure. In particular, the statute gives CHT considerable discre- 
tionary authority over its internal management and regulations in  order 
to enhance operational efficiency. It is designed to free CHT from many 336  Shin-Horng Chen 
limitations normally imposed on state enterprises that may not be compat- 
ible with commercial best practices. 
Following the passage of the three telecommunications reform acts, the 
restructuring of the DGT took place on 1 July 1996. The business arms 
of the DGT were spun off to form CHT and incorporated as a state enter- 
prise. The rest of the DGT, staffed by 500 employees or so, has since acted 
merely as a regulatory authority. 
In addition, from 1996 onward, several significant milestones in market 
liberalization have been planned or realized in  the telecommunications 
sector in Taiwan. First, four mobile communications services, including 
radio paging, cellular phones, trunked radio, and mobile data communica- 
tions, have been liberalized. In these segments, a total of fifty-three op- 
erating licenses were issued to private operators, in addition to CHT, at 
the beginning of  1997 (eight licenses each for radio paging and cellular 
phones, twenty for trunked radio, and seventeen for mobile data commu- 
nications; Chen 1997). Other segments of Type I services are also sched- 
uled to be liberalized in the next five years (fig. 11.1). The next target for 
market liberalization is satellite communications, which will take place by 
the end of  1999. Before July 2001, the rest of Type I services, including 
local calls, long-distance calls, international calls, broadband switching 
communications, and high-speed data communications, will be opened to 
the private sector. More important, CHT will be privatized at that time. 
Taiwan is in the middle of liberalizing its telecommunications market. 
The time is perhaps not ripe for a comprehensive evaluation of the impact 
of the liberalization program as a whole, but there are signs that market 
liberalization has started to generate some positive results (Chen 1997). 
Prominent among them is the reduction of telecommunications tariffs. On 
the brink of the entry of private mobile communications operators, CHT 
gained approval from the regulator to rebalance its tariffs (table 11.5). 
Despite a substantial increase (70 percent) in local call tariffs to eliminate 
cross-subsidization, tariffs for mobile phones, radio paging, and interna- 
tional calls have fallen. Important reductions of 45 and 25  percent for 
nationwide and regionwide services, respectively, have occurred. Tariffs 
for international calls have also decreased, by 3 to 27 percent. However, it 
is believed that CHT’s new tariffs still diverge from costs and hence that 
room remains for further tariff rebalancing. On top of that, the liberaliza- 
tion is beset by several problems, to which I now turn. 
11.4  Criticisms of the Liberalization Program 
Criticisms have been leveled against the government’s telecommunica- 
tions liberalization program. First, the breakdown of Type I and Type I1 
services gave rise to controversy. As described above, Type I services refer 
to the installation of telecommunications machinery and line facilities and Year 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  July 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  radio paging 3' 
I  I  cellular phone :8' 
I  1  trunkcd radio :20' 
I  I  very mail  aperture 
terminal" 
I 
satellite linked mobile  I  phone" 
I 
satellite stationary  I  communications.' 
I  I  long-distance call" 




privatization of CHT"  1 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  July 
Fig. 11.1  Schedule of telecommunications liberalization in Taiwan, 1995 onward 
Source: Adapted from Chen (1997). 
*Number of private operators, in addition to Chunghwa Telecom (CHT). 
**Scheduled to be liberalized. 338  Shin-Horng Chen 
Table 11.5  Changes in Chunghwa Telecom’s Tariffs, Effective 1 July 1997 
Category  Old Tariff  New Tariff  Difference (YO) 
Local calls 
Public phone calls 
Mobile phone calls 
(nationwide) 











NT$l per 5 minutes 
NT$l per 3 minutes 
NT$6.5 per minute 
(peak time) 
NT$3.3 per minute 
(off-peak time) 
NT$5 per minute 
(peak time) 




NT$1.7 per 5 minutes  +70 
(peak time) 
(off-peak time) 
NT$l per 2 minutes 
NT$l per 10 minutes  -  50 
+  50 
NT$5.6 per minute  -  14 
NT$3 per minute  -9 
NT$4.5 per minute  -10 
NT$2 per minute  -  20 
NT$300  -45 
NT$l50  -  25 
-3  to -27 
Source: Compiled from Chunghwa Telecom press releases. 
to services provided through owned circuits and facilities. Services other 
than Type I are referred to as Type  I1 operations. In other words, the 
definition of Type I1 services is characterized by  a negative list that alleg- 
edly allows for the introduction of new services in line with technological 
advancement without being unduly hampered by existing regulations. In 
practice, Type I services-though  by law apparently facility based rather 
than service based-are  itemized to include local calls, toll calls, interna- 
tional calls, mobile communications, satellite communications, broadband 
switching communications, and  high-speed data communications. This 
gives rise to controversy over whether callback and Internet phone ser- 
vices should be legally permissible. Admittedly, these two services have a 
substantial impact on wireline voice communications, thus public telecom- 
munications operators and even telecommunications authorities through- 
out the world tend to look on them with hostility. CHT also insists that 
callback and Internet phone services be banned. However, legally speak- 
ing, the prohibition is open to question. While they perform the function 
of voice communications, callback and Internet phone services by nature 
appear to be value-added services and hence are, from a legal perspective, 
closer to Type I1 than to Type I operations and thus should be opened to 
private competition. On top of  that, CHT’s wrangling over the private 
provision of callback and Internet phone services is at odds with the trend Telecommunications Liberalization: A Taiwanese Perspective  339 
in the telecommunications industry, according to which new technologies 
often result in productive economic efficiency in the form of lower costs 
and superior services (Hausman 1996). To capitalize on new technologies 
available in the marketplace or looming on the horizon, regulations must 
be continuously upgraded to allow for the reality of complementary and 
competing services. 
Also under attack is the DGT’s proposal to regulate Type I carriers with 
rate-of-return  regulation, as  opposed  to price-cap regulation.  Rate-of- 
return regulation, with a profit cap of 11.5 percent, has been used in Tai- 
wan to regulate public utilities, including telecommunications. By linking 
allowed revenues to realized or estimated production costs, rate-of-return 
regulation may  weaken incentives on the part of  the regulated firm to 
reduce operating costs and to develop and introduce new and innovative 
services (Sappington and Weisman 1996, 5). In contrast, in OECD coun- 
tries rate-of-return regulation is being replaced by  price-cap regulation 
(OECD 1995, 18). At the time of writing, the DGT is indeed in the process 
of formulating a price-cap regulation. It is generally agreed that price-cap 
regulation, by controlling the prices charged by  regulated firms, provides 
enhanced incentive for cost reduction relative to rate-of-return regulation. 
Having said that, the move to price-cap regulation will make the scope of 
bargaining more explicit (over the productivity offsets, e.g.) between the 
two sides of  the regulatory relationship (Braeutigam and Panzar  1993). 
Care, therefore, should be taken to enhance the regulatory function and 
oversight. 
More controversial is the 20 percent foreign capital limit imposed on 
Type I enterprises. Elsewhere I have demonstrated that foreign participa- 
tion, in terms of business opportunities, in Taiwan’s telecommunications 
market is much wider than implied by the foreign equity cap (Chen 1997), 
but such tight control on foreign ownership is hard to justify. The main 
reason for imposing the foreign capital limit appears to rest mainly on the 
fear that experienced foreign telecommunications carriers may leverage 
incumbency  advantages to  dominate  the  local market;  thus economic 
rents arising from liberalization would be captured mainly by foreign in- 
vestors at the expense of domestic firms. Such an argument has little merit 
because economic rents can be preserved for the host economy in a more 
efficient way  by  policies other than foreign ownership restrictions (Glo- 
berman 1995). Above all, it is preferable to “tax away” economic rents, as 
far as possible, from private firms, regardless of nationality, by fine-tuning 
the regulatory regime rather than to take the existence of economic rents 
for granted. Added to this, the foreign capital limit is at odds with the 
vision of the APROC plan, which champions the principles of liberaliza- 
tion and internationalization in developing Taiwan into a telecommunica- 
tions center in the Asia-Pacific region. Since Taiwan is a laggard in global 
telecommunications, foreign carriers can help Taiwan to fulfill the goals 340  Shin-Horng Chen 
of the APROC plan, particularly the telecommunications center. Tighter 
control of foreign ownership, however, leaves less room for domestic carri- 
ers to forge strategic alliances with foreign firms because such alliances 
frequently involve equity participation. It is encouraging to learn, at the 
time of writing, that the authority is reconsidering its position on the for- 
eign investment cap. 
11.5  Problems Arising from Market Entry 
The initial impact of telecommunications liberalization is open market 
access, but successful market entry depends on the incumbent’s offering 
interconnection, due to the prevalence of interconnected networks in the 
industry. In this regard, the literature on telecommunications liberalization 
is replete with discussions of access pricing regulations (e.g., Doyle 1997). 
In Taiwan, the issue of interconnection rates has indeed been central to 
mobile communications liberalization, and opinions are divided between 
CHT and mobile communications carriers. At the time of writing, CHT 
and mobile communications operators are still struggling to reach agree- 
ment on interconnection rates. While CHT proposes to charge NT$l.86 
per  minute  for interconnection, mobile  communications  operators are 
willing to pay only NT$1.01 per minute. This huge gap has something to 
do with the differences in the two sides’ views on which cost items should 
be included and the accuracy of CHT’s cost data. 
This is, however, part of the interconnection issue. For mobile commu- 
nications carriers, interconnection involves a physical link, via El leased 
lines, between their own networks and CHT’s public switched telephone 
network. The demand for installation of the requisite El lines, however, 
outstrips supply due to CHT’s poor planning and delay in the procure- 
ment process. New entrants in mobile communications may therefore be 
behind schedule in launching their operations.  For this reason, CHT is 
vulnerable to the criticism that it tactically forecloses entry. Alternatively, 
mobile communications carriers may opt to bypass to some extent CHT’s 
networks by means of microwave or very small aperture terminal (VSAT) 
links, which nonetheless remain handicapped by current regulations. The 
spectrum required  for interconnection through  microwave has  not yet 
been made available by the DGT and is vulnerable to interference. Neither 
is the VSAT solution  feasible currently  because voice communications 
through VSAT have not yet been liberalized. These interconnection prob- 
lems raise the fear that mobile communications liberalization may be un- 
dermined by incumbent manipulation and out-of-date regulations. 
The prospects for new mobile communications carriers are also compli- 
cated by other issues such as numbering and portability of numbers. Num- 
bering in the telecommunications industry refers to the arrangement for 
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ers. Though seen primarily as a technical issue, it has had economic and 
regulatory implications (ICCP 1995). Where the incumbent has control 
over number allocation functions or enjoys proprietary rights over num- 
bers, new entrants may face additional barriers to entry, and thus competi- 
tion is restrained. The portability of numbers enables consumers to shift 
completely to other carriers without changing their numbers so that negli- 
gible switching costs will be incurred. Lessons distilled from OECD coun- 
tries show that lack of number portability between carriers has acted as 
deterrent to competition because it restrains consumers from migrating to 
a new  entrant even if  it offers a lower tariff (ICCP 1995). Despite the 
significant implications for fair competition, these two issues have been 
low on the DGT’s agenda and will not be dealt with technically for two 
years. New entrants to the mobile communications market will therefore 
be threatened by a high magnitude of such incumbency advantages at first. 
The fortune of some, if not many, of the new mobile communications 
carriers is also at risk because of “service convergence” among different 
segments of mobile communications. By  service convergence, we  refer to 
the extent to which services provided by different types of communications 
resemble one another. Thanks to technological progress, cellular phones 
nowadays can  provide short message  services that  were  only available 
through  radio paging before. Two-way  communications services devel- 
oped by CT-2 and radio paging operators duplicate part of cellular phone 
service. New trunked radios are also able to provide communications ser- 
vices like cellular phones. Looming on the horizon is “personal communi- 
cations services” (PCS), which is basically a cellular phone including such 
features as electronic messaging and paging on the same handset. Such 
examples imply that the functional boundaries between various segments 
of mobile communications are becoming blurred; thus their markets have 
overlapped. Two points are particularly noteworthy here. First, to the ex- 
tent that new services are technologically feasible, their introduction into 
the marketplace rests on the relaxation of relevant regulations. A manifes- 
tation of this point is that the unavailability of spectrum has slowed the 
introduction of two-way paging in Taiwan. In other words, outworn regu- 
lations can be a bottleneck that paralyzes new technologies and services. 
On the other hand, should those new services become marketable, various 
kinds of mobile communications would encroach on each other’s markets; 
thus some operators may find their markets being taken away. As a matter 
of fact, CT-2 operators reportedly have had doubts from the very begin- 
ning, due to the functional limitation of CT-2 services and potential mar- 
ket encroachment made by  cellular phone and digital enhanced cordless 
telephone carriers. A few of the nine CT-2 license winners have just started 
commercial operations but are having difficulty attracting subscribers. A 
private telecommunications firm, which was the major shareholder in two 
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less than a year.  Some may be inclined to position CT-2 services as a 
“transitional” product. If this is the case, “regulation regimes designed to 
permit and/or promote entry may well end up achieving little more than 
a noisy market periphery around a fundamentally uncompetitive core” 
(Cave  1996, 105). A danger, therefore, is  that market entry may  fail to 
deliver economic efficiency in terms of making the best use of resources. 
Furthermore, Amendola  and  Ferraiuolo  (1995)  note  that cellular tele- 
phony is characterized by technological incrementalism and considerable 
economies of scope in building and operating different mobile services in 
the same area. Taking into account these features, they then call for a 
comprehensive regulatory framework, encompassing the entire field  of 
mobile telephony, rather than regulating each new mobile service as if  it 
were a new separate market. In light of the service convergence discussed 
above and the fact that the time span of Taiwan’s mobile communications 
licenses is either ten or fifteen years, which is long enough for advanced 
mobile services, such as PCS, to take root in Taiwan, I echo Amendola 
and Ferraiuolo’s proposal. 
11.6  Industrial Policy versus Competition Policy 
Telecommunications  policy in Taiwan has retained a flavor of industrial 
policy. A typical case in point is the practice of only procuring systems 
from local subsidiaries of  AT&T,  Alcatel, and Siemens in exchange for 
technology transfer-known  as the “three systems, three suppliers” policy. 
This policy has been criticized for restraining competition in the telecom- 
munications system market without generating much success in techno- 
logical localization. In addition,  most  domestic communications firms 
have been kept from entering the core of the telecommunications equip- 
ment industry. Owing partly to this, the lion’s share of the business oppor- 
tunities arising from the liberalization of mobile communications have 
been out of the reach of local communications firms (Chen 1997). 
The implementation of telecommunications liberalization has brought 
the  “three systems, three  suppliers” policy under  scrutiny. On the  one 
hand, the proliferation of private operators resulting from opening the 
mobile communications market has made it impossible to sustain the pol- 
icy. To the extent that private operators are able to compete efficiently in 
the marketplace, they have to adopt best-practice technology wherever 
available, rather than merely limit themselves to indigenous supply, if any. 
On the other hand, binding CHT to the “three systems, three suppliers” 
policy may  sacrifice its  competitiveness and  the  technological perfor- 
mance of the backbone networks in Taiwan. At the time of writing, the 
“three systems, three suppliers” policy has been exposed to critical review 
by the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission. The policy might be abandoned. 
This, however, will not eliminate the possibility that industrial policy con- Telecommunications Liberalization: A Taiwanese Perspective  343 
siderations will continue to outweigh competition policy in Taiwan’s de- 
regulation process. Another case in  point is a paging operator’s call for 
government action to fight for medium-speed paging technology, which is 
currently the dominant standard in Taiwan but is in the process of being 
replaced by  high-speed paging technology. Admittedly, telecommunica- 
tions liberalization will create enormous business opportunities for service 
providers and equipment producers. It is difficult to accept the scenario 
that the lion’s share of those business opportunities will  be captured by 
foreign firms. One must bear in mind, however, that service and technolog- 
ical innovations in telecommunications are characterized by  continuous 
flux. Protecting domestic firms by blocking new innovations or technolog- 
ies runs the risk of decreasing telecommunications competitiveness.  Need- 
less to say, the liberalization policy itself could dilute the influence of gov- 
ernment mandates because both private and public operators have to fight 
for their fortunes in a more market-oriented way. 
11.7  Emerging Issues 
A couple of emerging issues also warrant the attention of the regulatory 
authority. The first concerns whether or not CHT needs to be divested, by 
structurally separating the operations of the incumbent. The cost of this 
separation is to forgo scope economies, but evidence gleaned from a study 
of the former DGT’s cost structure does not support the existence of such 
economies (CEPD 1996). A more sentimental appeal against the proposed 
divestiture of CHT seems to rest on the fear that since CHT has just spun 
off from the former DGT, the more radical reform of separation may cause 
additional chaos. Therefore, the authority appears to be reluctant to tackle 
the issue and has decided to leave it to the board of CHT. It should be 
noted, however, that the structure of the incumbent can have an impact 
on access pricing and hence on the extent of fair competition between the 
incumbent and new entrants (Doyle 1997,86). In Taiwan, competition has 
not yet  encroached on the local and long-distance service markets. The 
vertical structure of CHT enables it to control the local and long-distance 
networks while competing with private operators in the mobile communi- 
cations market, which can lead to foreclosure and predatory action. New 
entrants in mobile communications are concerned about discrimination in 
the provision of access to essential facilities and access prices. Indeed, the 
possibility  of  predatory  action  is  not  remote  because information  on 
CHT’s operating costs has not been made transparent enough to distin- 
guish its tariff rebalancing policy from a predatory pricing strategy, and 
regulatory oversight by  the DGT remains inadequate (Chou  1996). Of 
course, this problem may be overcome by other regulatory tools, for ex- 
ample, requiring separate accounting for CHT’s operations. Nonetheless, 
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addressed by  the regulatory authority rather  than left in the hands of 
CHT itself. 
The second issue that deserves the attention of the regulatory authority 
relates  to  the  cross-entry of  telecommunications and  cable  television 
(CATV). The convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting 
has been documented, and the two are now segregated mainly by regula- 
tion rather than by technology itself (Kelly 1989). A decision to be made 
by the regulatory authority is whether telecommunications and CATV op- 
erators should be  allowed to penetrate each other’s markets. Likewise in 
Taiwan,  the  boundaries  between  telecommunications and  CATV  are 
largely artificial, since these two services are currently governed as sepa- 
rate sectors. Such regulation has little merit in terms of promoting tele- 
communications competition  and  developing the NIL  CATV  provides 
much wider band transmission services than do traditional telecommuni- 
cations networks, which presents substantial underexplored potential for 
providing telecommunications services. To the extent that they are con- 
nected  by  fiberoptic backbones,  CATV  networks  are  able  to provide 
broadband services to the home, which is in line with one of the aims of 
the NII program. In addition, they will form the capacity for promoting 
network competition in local call services. It is estimated that the penetra- 
tion rate for CATV in Taiwan is above 60 per 100 households. Removing 
the artificial boundaries between telecommunications and CATV can fa- 
cilitate fulfilling the  aims of  telecommunications liberalization and the 
NII. It is noted that some may not be so optimistic about the convergence 
of CATV and telecommunications, but the cross-entry of these two ser- 
vices has been realized in some OECD countries (OECD 1997, 77-79).  In 
Taiwan, a decision has been made to allow CATV operators to explore 
broadband Internet opportunities over coaxial cable. CATV and telecom- 
munications operators have also developed strong interest in penetrating 
each other’s markets. The possibility of removing market boundaries is 
therefore not remote. The problem, for one thing, is that CATV operators 
have a size disadvantage due mainly to a governmental policy to divide 
the national CATV market into fifty-one sections. This size disparity may 
shift the balance toward telecommunications operators once cross-entry 
is permitted. 
11.8  Conclusion 
The global telecommunications landscape has been shaped by techno- 
logical, economic, and regulatory forces. Despite having advanced half- 
way, telecommunications liberalization in Taiwan has already reached the 
stage where attention should be paid to the essential issue of how to foster 
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with overhauling the regulatory regime. If the regulatory authority in Tai- 
wan is reluctant to adopt the policy of asymmetric regulation in favor of 
new entrants, it at least has to make sure that they can compete on an 
equal footing with the incumbent. The opposite, however, appears to be 
the case. Apart from asymmetric market positions vis-a-vis CHT, the new 
entrants are beset by  problems concerning interconnection, numbering, 
and so on, due to regulatory slack or ignorance. Such problems have some- 
thing to do with the dominance of CHT and the extent to which the DGT 
is willing to break with its past and CHT and reposition itself as a genuine 
regulator. In essence, central to the telecommunications liberalization pol- 
icy is the introduction of efficient and effective competition in the market 
under an appropriate regulatory regime, which is much more than opening 
the market. 
Moreover, the pace of technological and service innovations in the tele- 
communications industry can quickly outdate policies. This is particularly 
true for developing countries like Taiwan because they are presented with 
advanced technologies and services developed elsewhere. This raises the 
question of what policy changes need to be made to ensure that the bene- 
fits of technological change can be fully realized. This question not only 
is important in its own right but also concerns telecommunications com- 
petition. A significant trend in the telecommunications industry is for new 
technologies to result in lower costs and superior services. The regulatory 
authority in Taiwan is not unaware of this trend but tends to manage it in 
a manner that favors CHT, without giving due consideration to its com- 
petitive impact and to the needs of the industry and the country. Competi- 
tion in mobile communications has been restrained because the DGT fails 
to meet new entrants’ needs to bypass CHT’s networks via microwave or 
VSAT links. Service  convergence among different segments of mobile com- 
munications  also challenges the traditional  practice  of regulating them 
as separate markets. In addition, the current prohibitions on the provision 
of callback and Internet phone services and the cross-entry of CATV and 
telecommunications  stifle  competition  from  new  complementary  and 
competing networks. The proliferation of new technologies and services 
will unleash the force of competition in telecommunications but not unless 
the regulatory regime is continuously upgraded. 
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Comment  Ramonette B. Serafica 
Shin-Horng Chen provides a good discussion of the reforms undertaken 
in the telecommunications industry in Taiwan. Figure 1  1.1, which shows 
the schedule of telecommunications liberalization in Taiwan from  1995 
onward, is particularly interesting because it captures the Taiwanese per- 
spective on telecommunications liberalization. The story behind the se- 
quence and timing of reforms would be a good addition so that readers 
can gain a deeper sense of the Taiwanese perspective. Another aspect of 
the paper that I find quite informative is the discussion of the underlying 
national objectives motivating further liberalization. Indeed, telecommu- 
nications is  becoming so critical an industry for every nation that it is 
important for us who are involved in policy research to share the lessons 
learned and strategies adopted so that our respective economies can be 
active players in the coming information century. 
The objective of the paper is  “to distill lessons that  may  add to the 
current  understanding  of  telecommunications liberalization outside the 
developed world.” However, given that the reform program in Taiwan is 
relatively young, I think that what the paper can realistically achieve is to 
raise the level of awareness of outsiders about the issues confronting Tai- 
wan so that parallelisms can be drawn that will  lead to a richer under- 
standing of telecommunications reform worldwide. Since Chen touches 
on potential problems that may  arise from the current policies, he may 
also want to look at the experiences of other countries that have adopted 
similar paths  and  from  there distill lessons that  may  be  applicable to 
Taiwan. 
After reading Chen’s paper, I realized that despite the differences be- 
tween Taiwan and the Philippines, particularly in terms of telecommunica- 
tions network development, we  nonetheless share similar concerns with 
respect to competition in the telecommunications industry. Three issues 
in particular I think parallel the concerns that have emerged in the Philip- 
pines. 
Is Divestiture a Prerequisite for Competition? 
One of the issues identified in the paper concerns the structure of CHT. 
Chen notes that CHT’s vertical structure allows it to control the local 
and long-distance markets while competing with private operators in the 
mobile communications market. Thus he asks whether CHT needs to be 
divested by structurally separating its operations. 
Based on the Philippine experience I can say that the fear of undesirable 
competitive behavior such as foreclosure and predatory pricing by a verti- 
cally integrated incumbent is not entirely unfounded. In 1993, the Philip- 
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pine government decided to open the international long-distance and cel- 
lular markets to competition. As a condition for entry in these lucrative 
lines of business, international gateway facility operators and cellular mo- 
bile telecommunications service operators were  also required to install 
fixed lines in both profitable and unprofitable areas, thereby opening the 
local exchange market to a duopoly. These reforms were  introduced to 
address the huge unmet demand existing at that time. With an asymmetri- 
cally competitive industry structure, however, a seamless telecommunica- 
tions network has so far been unattainable.’ The Philippine Long Distance 
Company (PLDT), a private firm that has enjoyed virtual monopoly of 
long-distance and local exchange service for more that sixty years in the 
country, has  made  interconnection  difficult  for  the  new  local players. 
Firms have expressed frustration over the delay in getting interconnection 
lines with PLDT, which owns the most extensive nationwide backbone 
and network. As the dominant firm, it is  able to control the setting of 
access charges and the pace with which interconnection takes place, to the 
detriment of competing firms. The regulator generally takes a hands-off 
stance and lets the individual firms negotiate through bilateral contracts. 
In a few years, this problem is expected to be less contentious as the net- 
works of the new firms grow. In the meantime, subscriber dissatisfaction 
brews. 
Another topic of hot debate at the moment concerns PLDT’s applica- 
tion for rate rebalancing. With the impending reduction of  accounting 
rates from U.S. telecommunications firms, PLDT has petitioned for a re- 
structuring of existing domestic toll service rates (increase in long-haul 
rates and decrease in  short-haul rates) and an increase in existing local 
exchange service rates. In addition, the company is also planning to adopt 
metered service rates. Competing firms have argued that the rates pro- 
posed by PLDT will allow it to undercut prices in high-revenue and com- 
petitive  areas,  which  these  firms  cannot  match  because  of  their 
government-mandated service obligations in unprofitable areas. With im- 
perfect knowledge of the true cost of service and lack of expertise within 
the regulatory agency it is difficult to distinguish between tariff rebalanc- 
ing and predatory pricing. 
These two situations illustrate the possibility of  exclusionary actions. 
As Chen has pointed out, divestiture may not be necessary if  alternative 
technologies exist that can bypass bottleneck facilities. It may also be the 
case that regulatory power is sufficient to discipline the behavior of the 
dominant  firm. In the  absence of  such conditions, divestiture may  be 
the next best solution. In addition to discussing the cost and benefits of 
1. According to Sharkey, “Competition is ‘asymmetric’  if one firm is overwhelmingly  larger 
than each of its potential competitors and if the rules of competitive conduct differ between 
the large and small firms. . . . The largest firm must also have a dominant market share” 
(1982, 206). Telecommunications Liberalization: A Taiwanese Perspective  349 
divestiture in  the Taiwanese case, the author may want to consider its 
implications in light of the final stretch of the reform program scheduled 
in 2001, which includes the privatization of CHT and the liberalization of 
the remaining  segments of  telecommunications.  Divestiture  may  make 
CHT less attractive to private investors but may draw more players into 
the liberalization program. The experience of other countries that have 
successfully introduced reforms in the sector should be examined (see Pe- 
trazzini 1995, e.g.). 
Regulation of Converging Technologies 
The paper cites the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunica- 
tions. Another convergence  would be information technology and telecom- 
munications. And with the creation of the national, regional, and global 
information infrastructures, all three will converge, at least from the regu- 
latory point of view, because the economics of multimedia will have impli- 
cations for competition policy. Already the convergence of information 
technology and telecommunications presents gray areas in terms of own- 
ership and the scope of competition. 
To  illustrate, value-added services such as the Internet are completely 
deregulated in the Philippines. Testimony to the fierce competition in the 
industry is the existence of close to a hundred Internet service providers 
(ISPs). This situation of unbridled competition is threatened by the poten- 
tial foreclosure by telecommunications firms who have commercial inter- 
ests in the Internet business as well. Again, a case in point is PLDT. In 
1996, it acquired majority control of INFOCOM Technologies, Inc., the 
largest ISP in the country. With the impending metering of local telephone 
rates as spearheaded by PLDT, independent ISPs fear that control of tele- 
communications facilities by competing ISP firms will unfairly jeopardize 
their operations. Thus the question arises of  whether there is a need to 
limit ownership and control of complementary goods and services. 
Telecommunications Policy in Support of National Goals 
Finally, I would like to point out that the Asia-Pacific Regional Opera- 
tions Center and the NII in Taiwan have equivalent initiatives in the Phil- 
ippines. The current government would also like to position  the Philip- 
pines as a center for knowledge-based industries, and the establishment of 
the NII is likewise part of the national agenda. These two initiatives re- 
quire advanced telecommunications networks and, therefore, the competi- 
tion that fosters the innovation needed to deliver the communications re- 
quirements of advanced users. 
Another national objective in the Philippines, however, merits equal at- 
tention. Unlike Taiwan, the telecommunications network in  the Philip- 
pines is relatively small, as evidenced by the current telephone density rate 
of about 5 lines per 100 Filipinos. Thus the attainment of universal service 
is still of  paramount concern. Under such conditions, the introduction 350  Shin-Horng Chen 
of competitive forces that tend to concentrate on serving high-revenue 
customers becomes problematic. 
The current strategy by the government is to impose service obligations 
on new firms in order to increase telephone penetration, particularly in 
the countryside. By next year, it is hoped that the density rate will double 
from the current figure as a result of this scheme. As I have argued else- 
where this is not a sustainable solution, and in fact it is contrary to the 
promotion of competition since, among other things, the dominant firm 
is not covered by this rule so that new firms operate at a disadvantage vis- 
a-vis PLDT. The task, therefore, is to think of a better alternative to the 
current situation. It would be useful for us to learn how universal service 
can be achieved in the era of competition. 
Conclusion 
These are just some of the issues that need to be resolved if we  are to 
create a credible competitive environment. I thank the author for provid- 
ing useful insights from the Taiwanese experience that have enabled me to 
think of similarities with the Philippine case. Indeed, the technology in- 
volved has universal application, so it is easy to understand why  similar 
concerns emerge. The differences lie in the unique social, political, and 
economic conditions of each country. 
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